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The dog has a special relationship with humans,
going beyond that of other domestic animals.
Recent evidence suggests this comes from
domestication rather than wolf behaviour, perhaps
involving something as simple as a change in natural
looking behaviour.
A dozen times a day, we follow someone’s eye gaze to
find out what interests them and what they are thinking
about: the tactic comes naturally to us. Small surprise,
then, that when our closest relatives, the chimpanzees,
were discovered also to follow eye-gaze it seemed
obvious that they too were interested in others’ atten-
tion and thoughts. But much diligent laboratory work
has failed to provide support for this idea, although
many experiments have confirmed that chimpanzees
are indeed good at following human gaze. They are not
fooled by occluding barriers and only look for a target
of gaze in places where sight can penetrate; nor are
they distracted by conspicuous targets closer to them
but slightly off-line. Chimpanzees do not, however,
seem to make the same deductions as we do from
gaze following. One example of this is that, when
experimenters have used their gaze to point to where
food is present, chimpanzees do not get it; if the
experimenters use their finger, hand or even their
whole arm to point, chimpanzees still seem to find it
difficult to follow the hint. Yet domestic dogs learn this
task easily, even those not from breeds specifically
bred as ‘pointers’.
Dogs are able to follow pointing by head and eyes,
or by hand, even if the hand is opposite to the side on
which the target lies — ‘crossed pointing’ — and even
if the hand remains stationary or the human moves in
a direction opposite to their pointing. These impres-
sive abilities raise two questions. Firstly, is this a
special-purpose skill or part of a complex of abilities
with wider implications? In humans, pointing and
gaze-following have been causally linked to reference,
one of the fundamentals of language [1]; moreover,
pointing and gaze following are generally seen as part
of a suite of abilities that together confer ‘theory of
mind’ [2]. Nothing in the normal behaviour of dogs
gives convincing evidence of any canine ability to
understand mental states, let alone reference.
Perhaps further work will overturn this bleak view, but
for the moment a special-purpose adaptation seems
most likely. But for what purpose: how and when did
these skills enter the canine repertoire? Many people
would have said we need look no further than the
dog’s wild ancestor, the wolf, whose pack hunting
must surely benefit from finely-tuned abilities to
indicate location or movement of prey with eyes and
nose. Now, two groups of researchers [3,4] have
found convincing evidence that the origin of dogs’
ability to point and to follow pointing lie elsewhere, in
the history of their domestication by humans.
The evidence comes from wolves that were brought
up as puppies with human carers and can therefore
be tested in direct comparison to dogs. Hare et al. [3]
used a variety of different cues to indicate which of
two locations held food: gaze alone, gaze and point-
ing, or gaze and pointing combined with audible
tapping on the place itself. Yet the wolves failed
resoundingly to follow the cues, in contrast to domes-
tic dogs which managed with any of them. It seems
particularly surprising that these wolves were unable,
despite over 30 trials on which getting a food reward
depended on a correct choice, to work out that
tapping on a box correlated with finding food inside it;
surely this is a simple task for any species able to
learn in social situations?
Miklósi et al. [4], reporting in this issue of Current
Biology, have an explanation for this puzzle: by their
standards, the wolves studied by Hare et al. [3] were
not properly socialized at all. True, the puppies were
reared in a human family from 10 days old, but they
could still interact with littermates and in any case this
regime only persisted for 5 weeks. Miklósi et al. [4]
worked much harder to socialize their subjects. Each
wolf was reared by a single human carer from 4 days
old for 3 months, and this involved 24 hour contact: the
wolves were carried in baby-slings and even slept with
the carers. As a result, each wolf’s attachment to their
primary carer is likely to be very much stronger, and it
is the carer who tests it. Unlike Hare et al.’s subjects,
none of these wolves had any difficulty understanding
indication by touching, and they readily followed point-
ing if the finger was placed near the target. They also
learned to follow distal pointing, although they only
developed this ability over many trials.
Nevertheless, even the most highly socialized
wolves perform at much lower levels than domestic
dogs on pointing tasks: and crucially, they have shown
no sign of understanding gaze, in the sense of using it
to find the target indicated. It does not seem that the
popular explanation, that dogs inherited their superior
abilities at using social cues from wolf ancestors, will
hold water; but if not, then what exactly has domesti-
cation done to the dog? Hare et al. [3] suggest only
that “some aspects of the socio-cognitive abilities of
dogs have converged … with those of humans” as a
result of “a phylogenetic process of enculturation,
perhaps similar in some ways to the ontogenetic
process of enculturation experienced by some non-
human primate individuals raised by humans”.
The meaning of Hare et al.’s [3] suggestion is not
immediately transparent. Ontogenetic enculturation is
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a process previously proposed by Michael Tomasello
and his co-workers [5] to account for the fact that
human-raised great apes succeed at many cognitive
tasks where zoo-raised or lab-raised individuals fail. In
brief, the idea is that the human mind is to a consider-
able degree a cultural product, and that human-
rearing is adapted to bring about this cultural
transformation [6]. Even when the subject is a non-
human ape, they suppose, some aspects of the
cultural achievement of human cognition can be
transmitted to it by human rearing. On this view,
enculturated apes have abilities that really ‘belong’ to
our species, not theirs. By no means all researchers
accept this, however. The alternative, eloquently
defended by Frans de Waal [7], is that human rearing
simply changes the ape’s orientation towards treating
people as significant others, and indeed viewing
themselves as people, so that they perform human-
posed and human-relevant tasks readily and reveal
their species’ natural abilities to the full. In any case,
‘phylogenetic enculturation’ is at the moment little
more than an intriguing label.
At the opposite extreme, Miklósi et al. [4] offer a
simple and straightforward answer, and back it with
an experiment. To them, the key thing is that wolves
do not look at faces: consequently, these animals
have little chance of learning the revealing contingen-
cies between gaze direction and events in the world.
If so, this neatly accounts for highly socialized wolves’
ability to learn the significance of touching, proximal
and (eventually) distal pointing, while still failing to
follow human gaze. 
To test this theory, Miklósi et al. [4] posed food-
retrieval tasks to both dogs and wolves, but then made
the tasks insoluble; for instance, where the solution
was to pull a cord attached to a food item, they nailed
down the string so that it could not be pulled. Domes-
tic dogs’ response was clear and immediate: they
turned to look at their owner’s face, and alternated
gaze between owner and task. Social referencing is an
important part of human communication, and these
appeals were readily understood. This does not mean
that their appeals were made for the same reasons as
a young child might, because it understood the supe-
rior knowledge of the adult. Quite the reverse: Miklósi
et al.’s [4] explanation works for an animal that has no
understanding of mental states, but can learn quickly
and — crucially — looks at the human face. 
Highly socialized wolves, in contrast, just kept trying
to solve the task and did not look round. Lacking an
innate tendency to look at human faces, wolves have
no chance of learning the key importance of gaze,
although they can readily pick up other human
methods of pointing. It seems Miklósi et al.’s group
have found a rather simple explanation for the differ-
ence in cognitive capacity: what domestication has
done for the dog is to select for the tendency to look
at the human face in situations of uncertainty. Our
long and productive association with the dog may
have followed from this single behavioural change,
they suggest, because it opens the door to mutual
learning of how to read the behavioural intentions and
likely needs of the other species.
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